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U.S. SUPREME COURT MAKES IN OFFICIAL- THUMBS
UP ON MANDATORY ARBITRATIONITHUMBS DOWN
ON CLASS ARBITRATION (AT&T MOBILE, LLC v.
CONCEPCION)
by
J.L. Yranski Nasuti, J.D., LL.M. *

In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act
1

(FAA) in order to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration
proceedings. Today the U.S. Supreme Court no longer bears
animosity to this particular form of alternative dispute
resolution. On the contrary, the majority of the current Court
"rigorously enforces" mandatory arbitration agreements
whether they have been negotiated at arms length between
merchants or have been presented to employees and consumers
in standard form contracts.
In t}le recent case of AT&T
Mobile, LLC v. Concepcion (AT&T Mobile), 2 the Court once
again upheld a mandatory arbitration clause--but a mandatory
arbitration that also contained an anti-class action provision-on the grounds that the savings clause of the FAA preempts the
application of a state law regarding unconscionable contracts.
I. BACKGROUND

In February 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion did what
many people do everyday- they entered into a wireless service
agreement. The provider of services in their case was Cingular
Wireless (which was subsequently acquired by AT&T in 2005
and renamed AT&T Mobility LCC in 2007). The agreement,
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which was executed at the provider's retail store in Carlsbad,
California, was a common "bundled" transaction in which each
of the Concepcions received a "free" cell phone in exchange
for agreeing to a two year service contract. The provider
subsequently charged the Concepcions $30.22- for sales tax
3
based on the full retail value of the "free" phones.
The original agreement between the Concepcions and
Cingular was a standard form contract that included a single
page statement of "Terms and Conditions." Among the terms
was a mandatory arbitration clause that also prohibited class
actions. The arbitration clause was located near the bottom of
the page in a paragraph that also stated the provider's limited
liability under the plan. The word "ARBITRATION," which
was capitalized and in bold, was followed by a sentence
4
instructing the consumer to "read this paragraph carefully."
The paragraph went on to state that the parties would
"negotiate in good faith to settle any dispute or claim arising
from or relating to this Agreement" ... and if the parties "do
not reach an agreement within 30 days, instead of suing in
court," the parties "agree to arbitrate any and all disputes and
A subsequent
claims arising out of this Agreement. " 5
provision stated that the parties "agree that no Arbitrator has
the authority to (1) award relief in excess of what this
agreement provides; (2) award punitive damages or any other
damages not measured by the prevailing party's actual
6
damages; or (3) order consolidation or class arbitration." The
only exception to the mandatory arbitration rule was if either
7
party elected to file a complaint in small claims court.
The Concepcions renewed their wireless agreements with
Cingular (and its successor, AT&T) on a number of occasions.
With each of the subsequent contracts, the Concepcions were
given a current statement of the "Terms of Service." All of
those statements included a "change-in-terms" clause that
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allowed the provider to unilaterally amend the terms and
conditions of the agreement at any time so long as the provider
notified the customers of the changes either in their monthly
bills or separately. 8 In December 2006, two months after the
Concepcions had renewed their wireless contract, AT&T
notified its customers that it had exercised its right under the
"change-in-terms" clause to revise the agreement's arbitration
policy. The amended arbitration provisions were much more
explicit and, AT&T would subsequently argue, much more
favorable to the consumer.
The revised agreement still required disputes to be resolved
in either small claims court or through individual (but not
class-wide) arbitration hearings. In addition it introduced six
significant changes. The first was the establishment of a new
premium payment term requiring the provider to pay the
customer $7,500 in the event that the arbitrator's actual award
was less than $7,500 but greater than the provider's last written
settlement offer prior to selection of the arbitrator. 9 The
second was AT&T's promise to pay double the amount of
customer's attorney fees and reimburse any of the attorney' s
reasonable expenses accrued while investigating, preparing,
and pursuing the client's claim in arbitration- but only if the
arbitrator awarded the customer more that the provider's last
written settlement offer. 10 The third prohibited the provider
from seeking attorneys' fees and expenses--even if it prevailed
in arbitration and even if it had the right to do so under the
11
The fourth allowed punitive damages to be awarded to
law.
12
the extent allowed in court.
The fifth provided that the
customer had the exclusive option of deciding whether the
arbitration would be conducted in person, by telephone, or
based solely on submission of documents--so long as the claim
was for $10,000 or less. 13 Finally, it specified that arbitration
would take place in the county of the customer's billing
address. 14
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II. PREVIOUS LITIGATION IN CALIFORNIA
The Concepcions were not the only dissatisfied California
consumers to have entered into similar wireless service
agreements with their cell phone providers. In late 2004 and
early 2005, Elizabeth Voorhies accepted a bundled transaction
with Cingular (through its agent Go Wireless) and Jennifer
Laster accepted one with T-Mobile. Each was given a "free
phone" and then charged for the sales tax on its full retail
value.
In May 2005, Voorhies, Laster, and an additional
plaintiff, Andrew Thompson, filed complaints against their
15
providers in the California Superior Court.
While
Thompson's case was dismissed without prej udice, the other
two where removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California under the Federal Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 (CAF A) . 16 In August 2005, Voorhies and Laster
filed an amended complaint on behalf of themselves and all
other consumers who had entered into similar bundled
transactions, received free phones, and been charged for the
sales tax. 17 The complaint alleged that the providers had
engaged in violations of California's False Advertising Law
19
and the
(FAL), 18 the Unfair Competition Law (UCL),
20
Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA).
The providers
responded by filing motions to compel arbitration and to
dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to § 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court denied the motion
to compel arbitration on the grounds that the arbitration
agreements were both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable under California contract law. The motion to
dismiss the amended complaint was granted without prejudice
since the plaintiffs, in their UCL and F AL claims, had failed to
allege reliance on the providers' misrepresentations when
making their decisions to accept the cell phones. The CLRA
claim, on the other hand, was dismissed with prejudice for
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26

failure to comply with statutory notice requirements set forth in
California Code§ 1782. 21

the Shroyer decision on their pending appeal.
At that point,
all of the defendants except T-Mobile agreed to voluntarily
dismiss their appeals. After the Circuit Court affirmed the
lower court's decision to deny T-Mobile's motion to dismiss,
T-Mobile filed an unsuccessful writ of certiorari with the U.S.
Supreme Court. In the meantime, the District Court lifted the
stay that had been .placed on the Laster case while the appeal
2
had been pending.

In December 2005, AT&T and T-Mobile (who were later
joined by the other defendants) appealed the Court's denial of
their motion to compel arbitration and moved to stay the
proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal. The plaintiffs
then filed a second amended complaint- to which the
defendants responded by filing an instant motion to dismiss.
The Court denied the defendants' motions to compel arbitration
and to dismiss the second complaint but
their motion to
2
stay the proceedings pending the appeal.

III. IMPACT OF SHROYER ON AT&T MOBILE
In March 2008, AT&T filed a motion to compel the
Concepcions to submit their dispute to the mandatory
individual arbitration procedure that was outlined in AT &T's
28
revised wireless agreement of December 2006. According to
AT&T, the class arbitration waiver in the amended agreement
was not only "substantially distinct" from the waiver
considered in the Shroyer case but it also provided a sufficient
substitute for any class action relief that its customers had
waived. The Concepcions responded with two arguments. The
first was that the terms of the 2006 revised arbitration provision
were inapplicable since the amendments had only been added
after the Concepcions had filed their lawsuit. The second was
that even if the revised terms relating to arbitration and class
actions were applicable they were still unconscionable and,
therefore, unenforceable under California law. While the
District Court ruled that federal and California law both
29
allowed AT&T to base its claim on the revised terms, it
denied AT&T's motion to compel arbitration on the grounds
that California contract law did not allow an unconscionable
contract provision to be enforced. 30 It concluded instead that
although the AT&T consumer agreement was only marginally
a contract of adhesion 3 1 and even though the premium damage
clause provided an incentive for consumers to pursue small
claims in arbitration, 32 the arbitration provision did not

The Concepcions filed their own lawsuit against AT&T in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California in
March 2006. Their complaint alleged that AT&T's practice of
charging sales taxes for phones that were advertised as "free"
constituted fraud. The following September, the U.S. District
Court consolidated the Concepcions' case with the Laster
putative class action lawsuit. 23
In August 2007, before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit had ruled on the lower court's denial of the
defendants' motion to compel arbitration in the Laster case, it
released its decision in the case of Shroyer v. New Cingular
24
Wireless.
The issue in Shroyer was whether the binding
arbitration clause and class arbitration waiver in Cingular's
standard service contract were enforceable. The three judge
panel concluded that, under California law, the provisions were
both unconscionable and unenforceable. The appellate court
also ruled that the FAA did not preempt the state law relating
to unconscionable contracts. 25 Since the class arbitration
waiver at issue in the Shroyer case was substantially identical
to the one at issue in Laster, the Court of Appeals asked the
parties in Laster to submit letter briefs discussing the effect of

....
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sufficiently deter AT&T from retaining the benefits of its
wrongful conduct and continuing that conduct with impunity. 33

arbitration agreements on the same footing as any other
contract since class arbitration waivers in adhesion contracts
and class action waivers in other contracts would both be
voided if found to be unconscionable. 39 As to the second
purpose of the FAA, the promotion of efficient and expeditious
resolution of claims, the Court reaffirmed its previous holding
in Shroyer in which it concluded that when large numbers of
consumers sought compensation based on similar claims, a
class arbitration proceeding was actually simpler, cheaper, and
faster for the consumers as well as the defendant company. 40

AT&T presented three main arguments when it filed its
appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals. The first was that the
decision in Shroyer was inapplicable since AT&T's amended
premium payment provision did not have the practical effect of
rendering AT&T immune from individual claims. The second
was that the amended arbitration clause was neither
unconscionable nor unenforceable. The third was that the FAA
preempted California's unconscionability law. 34 A three judge
panel unanimously rejected each claim and affirmed the lower
court' s decision.

IV. AT&T MOBILE AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
Business and consumer groups both knew that a great deal
was at stake when the U.S. Supreme Court granted the writ of
certiorari to hear the case (now under the heading of AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion et ux.) Yet even after oral
arguments had concluded, it was still unclear where the nine
justices stood on the three most compelling issues- whether
there was any reason in this particular case for not continuing
the general policy of favoring arbitration agreements, whether
there was a specific justification for allowing class action
waivers in consumer arbitration agreements, and whether the
FAA preempted the California law on unconscionability. It
was not until April 27, 2011, when Justice Antonin Scalia
began to deliver the decision of the Court that it became
evident that consumers who entered into standard form
contracts containing mandatory arbitration agreements and
class action waivers had lost in a very big way.

The Ninth Circuit's de nova review of the motion to compel
arbitration began by reaffirming the holding of the California
Supreme Court in Discover Bank v. Superior Court. 35 In that
case, the state court had ruled that a class action waiver in a
mandatory arbitration provision was unconscionable if it was
part of a consumer adhesion contract " in which disputes
between the contracting parties predictably involve small
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with
the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of
individually small sums of money." 36 The Court of Appeals
held that, under state law, AT&T's premium payment
provision did not negate the unconscionability of the class
action waiver. Although it was true that the provision would
penalize AT&T if it low-balled an offer, it still did nothing to
provide incentives to individual customers to pursue small
37
claims.
The Court concluded that the FAA did not preempt
California' s unconscionability law since the state law did not
stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 38 California
law did not undermine the FAA's purpose of placing

The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4, decision reversed the
Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case. Justice
Scalia's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Anthony Kennedy, and Samuel Alito. Justice Clarence
Thomas delivered a concurring opinion and Justice Stephen

....
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Breyer issued a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonya Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.
The focus of all three opinions was the interpretation of §2 of
the FAA- which the Court, in an earlier decision, had
characterized as "the primary substantive provision of the
41
Section 2 states that: "A written provision in any
Act."
maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
42
contract. " It was the interpretation of the second part of this
section- the savings clause-on which the justices disagree.

A. Majority Opinion
According to Scalia, the primary issue before the Court was
"whether the FAA prohibits States from conditioning the
enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the
availability of classwide arbitration procedures." 43 To resolve
that issue it was necessary to determine whether California's
rule regarding unconscionability (as articulated in the Discover
Bank case) was covered by the FAA's savings clause. Scalia
began his analysis of that issue only after reaffirming the
Court's previous holdings that Section 2 of the FAA reflects a
" liberal federal policy favoring arbitration" 44 and the
"fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of
. agreements were on
contract. , 45 A s a consequence, arb.1tratwn
equal footing with any other contracts and should be enforced
according to their terms- unless, under the terms of the
savings clause, they were found to be unenforceable "upon
such grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract." It was at this point, that Scalia delivered a
decision that greatly limited the scope of the savings clause
especially with regard to consumer arbitration agreements.
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Scalia acknowledged that the FAA's savings clause allowed
an arbitration agreement to be invalidated by ""generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability" but not by defenses that apply only to
arbitration or derive their meanin? from the fact that an
4
He then addressed the
agreement to arbitrate is at issue."
validity of the Discover Bank holding that classified collective
arbitration waivers as unconscionable only when they were
included in consumer contracts. Under California statutory
law, a court may either refuse to enforce any contract that was
" unconscionable at the time it was made" or "limit the
47
In the Discover
application of any unconscionable clause."
Bank case, the California Supreme Court found that a class
action waiver in a consumer adhesion contract typically applied
to disputes that involved small sums of money and a party with
superior bargaining power who included the waiver in the
contract in order to cheat large numbers of consumers out of
individually small sums of money.
The waiver was
unconscionable because it exempted the non-consumer party to
the contract from its own fraud or willful injury to the
consumer party.
Scalia presented two alternative possibilities for deciding
the outcome of the case. If California' s unconscionability
doctrine and policy against exculpation were grounds "that
exist at law or equity for the revocation of a contract," then
they were applicable under the FAA's savings clause. On the
other hand, if it turned out that these generally applicable
doctrines had been used to disfavor arbitration , they were
preempted by the FAA. 48 Scalia chose the second theory to
He
rule against consumers and in favor of business.
hypothesized that a state could not target consumer arbitration
agreements as unconscionable or unenforceable simply because
they deprived the consumer of judicially monitored discovery
or did not abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence or did not
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allow for a trial by jury. Such actions would clearly be seen as
obstacles to the accomplishment of the stated purposes of the
FAA. Similarly, if the "overarching purpose" of the FAA was
"to
the enforcement
agreements accordinffl
to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings,"4
then "requiring the availability of classwide arbitration
interfere[ d] with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus
create[ d) a scheme inconsistent with the FAA." 50
Scalia referred to §§2, 3, and 4 of the FAA to support his
position that the principal purpose of the FAA was to ensure
that private arbitration agreements were enforced according to
their terms. Section 2 stated that, subject to the savings clause,
arbitration agreements were "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable." Section 3 required litigation of arbitral claims to
be stayed pending arbitration of those claims "in accordance
with the terms of the agreement." Finally, §4 instructed courts
to compel arbitration "in accordance with the terms of the
agreement" so long as the "making of the arbitration agreement
or the failure ... to perform the same" was not at issue. Scalia
reasoned that parties to an arbitration agreement may specify
51
the issues to be arbitrated, select the rules of arbitration, 52 and
limit with whom a party may arbitrate its dispute. 53
This
ability to design particular arbitration processes according to
the needs of different kinds of disputes reduced the cost at the
same time that it increased the speed of dispute resolution.
In his dissenting opinion, Breyer quoted the case of Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd54 in which the Supreme Court
" reject[ed] the suggestion that the overriding goal of the
Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of
claims." Scalia claimed that the dissent's use of that particular
quote was misleading. Although it was true that the Court in
Dean Witter stated that the purpose of the FAA was to "ensure
judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to
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arbitrate," 55 it also pointed out that "this is not to say that
Congress was blind to the potential benefit of the legislation for
56
expedited resolution of disputes."
In the present case, Scalia found no conflict between the
two goals of the FAA- the enforcement of private agreements
and the encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute
resolution- in enforcing the terms of the AT&T arbitration
clause. He did, however, see a conflict between the FAA's
promotion of arbitration and California's Discover Bank rule.
The Discover Bank rule interfered with arbitration the same
way a state law rule that required the parties to exhaust
administrative remedies before proceeding to arbitration
57
Although the California
frustrated the objective of the FAA.
rule did not require class-wide arbitration in all consumer
contract cases, it did have the same practical result. The
application of the rule was limited to adhesion contracts where
the damages were predictably small and the consumer alleged a
scheme to cheat consumers. Scalia, however, noted that most
consumer contracts were adhesion contracts, that the idea of a
small claim was very relative, and that all the consumer had to
do was allege a scheme to cheat. As a result, most consumers
would have the option to resolve their disputes through
bilateral arbitration or through class arbitration. Given that
option, Scalia speculated that a consumer would have difficulty
finding a lawyer who would be willing to handle an individual
arbitration claim when the possibility of a class action existed.
Businesses, on the other hand, would have less incentive to use
arbitration for individual claims when faced with exposure to
the inevitable class arbitration.

In order to illustrate the problems ansmg from class
arbitration Scalia referred to the recent case of Stolt-Nielen v.
lnt 'I. Corp. 58 in which the Supreme Court held
that an arbitration panel had exceeded its authority under the
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when it imposed class procedures that arose from policy
Judgments and not from the terms of the arbitration agreement
or the interpretative principals of contract law. The basis for
the decision was the Court's conclusion that the "changes
brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitration to classaction arbitration" were "fundamental." 59 In class actions
parties may be absent, additional and different procedures may
be needed, there is the potential for a loss of confidentiality,
and, it is likely that there will not be many arbitrators
knowledgeable in the procedural aspects of class certification.
Scalia then focused on the three problematic differences
between bilateral arbitration and class action arbitration. The
first was the loss of the primary advantage of arbitration- its
informality.
In bilateral arbitration, the parties "forgo
procedural rigor and appellate review" in exchange for "lower
costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose
expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes. " 60 In class
action arbitration, the arbitrators must certify the class and
determine how discovery for the class witt be conducted before
they can even begin to consider the merits of the claims. Scalia
cited a study by the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
reporting that, on the average, it took six months to resolve an
individual consumer arbitration claim on the merits (four
months if the arbitration was conducted by documents only.) 61
Of the 283 class arbitration cases opened as of September
2009, 121 remained active, 162 had been settled, withdrawn, or
dismissed, and not a single one had resulted in a final award on
the merits.
The median time from filing to settlement,
withdrawal or dismissal of class arbitration cases that were no
longer active was 583 days. 62
The second difference between bilateral and class action
arbitration cases was that class arbitration required procedural
formality similar to that found in the Federal Rules of Civil
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Procedure in order to protect the interests of all members of the
class. 63 Scalia noted that many procedural problems faci ng
arbitrators in class action cases had certainly not been
anticipated by the drafters of the FAA since class actions had
not even been available at the time the statute was enacted.
The final difference, which seemed to be particularly
important to Scalia, was the fact that class arbitration greatly
increased the risks to defendants. The defendants were aware
that it was inevitable that errors might occur in informal
arbitration procedures which could not be corrected through an
appeal process. But, it was an infrequent cost that they were
willing to pay in exchange for not having to incur the expenses
of going to court. That cost-benefit analysis changed, however,
when the inevitable error no longer involved a relatively small
individual claim but claims of a sizeable class of plaintiffs. In
those instances, even the chance of an error might pressure a
defendant into settling claims which, on the merits, might have
been questionable. An important issue in a class action case
involves the certification of the class. Under the FAA, the only
time that a court may vacate an arbitral award was if it "was
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means"; "the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing .. . or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy[,] or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced"; or if the
"arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final , and definite award . . . was not
rnade." 64 While certification decisions were reviewable, under
the FAA review was limited to the misconduct of the
arbitrators and not on an error in applying the law. Under the
circumstances, Scalia doubted whether a defendant would
agree to class arbitration with no means of review or whether
Congress would want state courts to place the defendant in
such a position.
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Scalia acknowledged that many of the small dollar claims
that individual consumers had against AT&T would never be
pursued without the benefit of a class action option. That result
by itself, however, did not justify allowing a state to require a
"procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA even if it is
The
thing that
desirable for unrelated reasons." 65
mattered was the fact that California's rule on
unconscionability "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. " 66

B. Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas' concurring opinion focused on the issue of
whether the Discover Bank rule was, under the savings clause
of the FAA, a "groun[ d] ... for the revocation of any contract."
Thomas' textual reading of §2 limited a court's ability to
revoke an arbitration agreement only on the basis of an
illegally (such as fraud or duress) in the formation of the
67
The fact that a particular state law defense
agreement.
applied "to any contract" was not by itself sufficient to revoke
the arbitration agreement if that defense represented nothing
more than a state's public policy against arbitration. It was
significant to Thomas that while §2 states that arbitration
provisions in contracts are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract," it "does not parallel the words
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" by referencing the
grounds as exist for the "invalidation, revocation, or
nonenforcement" of any contract." 68 The omission allowed him
to conclude that the exception in the savings clause did not
apply to any contract defense but only to a subset of those
defenses. Although Thomas acknowledged that courts have
referred
concepts of revocability, validity, and
enforceability Interchangeably, he found it significant that
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Congress only chose to include the concept of revocability in
the savings clause.
To understand the meaning of the savings clause, Thomas
turned to §4 of the FAA (which specified that if a court was
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the
failure to comply was not an issue, it must order arbitration
according to the terms of the agreement.) He concluded that if
§2 was read harmoniously with §4 then the only grounds for
revoking an arbitration agreement under §2 would be those
relating to the making of the agreement- and not other
defenses- such as public policy- that were unrelated to the
69
making of the agreement.
Under the Discover Bank rule, the class action waiver in a
consumer contract of adhesion was unconscionable because it
was unlawfully exculpatory- and contrary to public policy.
But the Discover Bank rule did not concern itself with the
'
.
making of the arbitration agreement. There was no clatm of
70
fraud, duress, or delusion on the part of the consumer. It was
the terms, conditions, and practices contained in the arbitration
agreement that the California court held to undermine public
policy. And, that public policy reason was an
ground for refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement smce 1t
had nothing to do with whether the contract was properly
made.
C. Dissenting Opinion

Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion reveals a frustration with
the majority's interpretation of the savings clause of the FAA.
According to the minority opinion, "grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract" would surely
include the Discover Bank rule. In the Discover Bank case, the
California court, interpreting §§ 1668 and 1670.5(a) of the
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California Civil Code, concluded that a class action waiver in a
consumer contract was exculpatory and unconscionable when:
1. the consumer contract was an adhesion contract, 2. the
disputes between the parties were predictably for small
amounts of damages, and 3. it was alleged that the party with
the superior bargaining power had carried out a scheme of
deliberately cheating large numbers of consumers out of
individually small sums of money.
The Discover Bank rule did not invalidate all class action
waivers in consumer contracts-only those which offended the
more general principle of unconscionability. That principle did
not target arbitration agreements since it applied equally to
class action litigation waivers as well as class action arbitration
waivers. It was, under the terms of the savings clause, a valid
ground on which to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement
that exists "for the revocation of any contract." (Emphasis
added.) 71
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arbitration contract term, it did not follow that that would
increase the complexity of the arbitration procedures. Breyer
also rejected the suggestion that applying the Discover Bank
rule was just as unacceptable as requiring arbitration
agreements to provide for the ultimate disposition by a jury, a
judicially monitored discovery, and the use of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 74 Class action arbitration was consistent
with arbitration and was well known in California and
elsewhere. Even the American Arbitration Association had
characterized class arbitration as "a fair, balanced, and efficient
. c Iass d.tsputes. "75
means of reso 1vmg

Breyer found no inconsistency between the Discover Bank
rule and the basic purpose behind the FAA. Although the
House Report in support of the original bill emphasized the
costliness and delays of litigation, the expeditious resolution of
claims through arbitration was not Congress' overriding goal in
enacting the FAA. The purpose of the FAA was to ensure the
judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements in commercial
contracts and admiralty contracts by placing them "upon the
same footing as other contracts." 72

Breyer challenged the majority's assumption that individual,
rather than class, arbitration, was a fundamental attribution of
arbitration. He found no basis for such a claim in the
legislative history. While it was true that at the time the FAA
was enacted, arbitration procedures had not yet been fully
developed, 76 there was evidence to suggest that as Congress
was considering the legislation it thought of arbitration
primarily in the context of merchants who "sought to resolve
disputes of fact, not law, under customs of their industries,
where the parties possessed roughly equivalent bargaining
This would suggest that a compelling
power." 77
Congressional concern had been that the bargaining power be
roughly equivalent in the arbitration process. If that were the
case, consumer class arbitration, which helps to level the
playing field with merchants, would be consistent with that
objective. 78

The minority opinion was critical of the majority's claim
that the Discover Bank rule was an obstacle to the objective of
the FAA since it would increase the complexity of arbitration
procedures and discourage parties from entering into
73
While the California rule might, in
arbitration agreements.
some instances, invalidate an unconscionable anti-class

The minority opinion also rejected the claim that the
incentives to include a mandatory arbitration clauses in
contracts would disappear if potential defendants knew that the
result might be complex class arbitration. On the issue of
incentives, Breyer argued that the relevant comparison was not
between bilateral arbitration and class action arbitration but
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between class arbitration and judicial class actions. 79 In such a
comparison, parties would not necessarily be discouraged from
including mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts. One
incentive for agreeing to arbitration is that it saves time. While
class arbitration may be more time consuming than bilateral
arbitration, it is still less time consuming than the average class
action litigation. Similarly, if speed in resolving a dispute is
an objective of the FAA, AAA statistics have suggested that "a
single class proceeding is surely more efficient than thousands
of separate proceedings for identical claims." 80 The dissent
found no empirical support for the majority's claim that there is
a disincentive for parties to submit high stack claims to
81
It also pointed out that even though contract
arbitration.
defenses might "slow down the dispute resolution process,"
that was something that federal arbitration law treated as a state
law matter--unless the defense was being used to disfavor
82
arbitration.
Scalia had highlighted the practical disadvantages of class
arbitration-it greatly increased the risks to the defendants and
might pressure defendants into settling questionable claims
rather than face the chance of a devastating loss. Breyer, on
the other hand, emphasized the countervailing advantages of
class arbitration. The first was that without the possibility of a
consolidated arbitration, many small dollar claimants would
simply abandon their claims. The second was that tenacious
parties, such as the Concepcions, would have difficulty finding
attorneys to represent them in proceedings involving small
claims and even smaller fees. As Breyer noted, "The realistic
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits,
but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or fanatic sues for
$30."83
In his review ofU.S. Supreme Court cases, Breyer found no
" meaningful" support for many of the majority's legal

-.......___ _
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conclusions. Instead he found precedents that authorized
84
complex arbitration procedures, upheld nondiscriminatory
85
state laws that slowed down the proceedings, and refused to
strike down a state statute that treated arbitration on par with
86
Other cases
judicial and administrative proceedings.
reaffirmed that the basic objective of the FAA was to treat
87
arbitration agreements "like all other contracts' and not to
immunize them from judicial challenges in a way that elevated
88
the arbitration agreement above other forms of contracts.
The dissenting opinion concluded with a brief discussion of
a basic premise of federalism- "that
does not
9
cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action." Breyer noted
that the savings clause of the FAA clearly recognized that the
states had a role of determining if there were grounds at law or
in equity for revoking a particular arbitration contract.
Consequently, the Court failed to honor federalist principles
when it ignored the specific language of the savings clause and
struck down the California law.
IV. CONCLUSION

The AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion case may very well
become a milestone case not because of the legal reasoning that
the Supreme Court used to interpret the savings clause or
because of its predictable reaffirmation of the arbitration
process. On the contrary, it may be remembered as the case
that not only changed the future of consumer class action
arbitration but also the future of consumer class action
litigation in the United States.
Soon after the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the
AT&T Mobility case, the Wall Street Journal and the New York
Times presented the public with two views of what was at
stake. The editors of The Wall Street Journal, referri ng to the
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case as "the $30 bonanza," conjured up a fantasy dream for
business . . . "[i]magine if class action lawsuits become a
historical curiosity like spiked hair and platform shoes. While
we would never underestimate the resilience of trial lawyers, a
case heard by the Supreme Court ... could put a damper on the
90
The New York Times, on the other
class action bonanza."
hand, referred to the AT&T Mobility case as the "latest in the
arbitration war-a battle over whether the United States will
increasingly have a privatized system of justice that bars
people from enforcing rights in court and, if so, what will be
considered fair in that system. It would be grossly unfair for
the court to let the corporation get away with what it wants to
in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion- a case that involves a small
amount of money and a huge principle." 91 In the end the $30
bonanza was not a windfall for trial lawyers and consumersbut a gigantic bonanza for business. In this case the winners
did take all.
The majority opinion focused on what would happen if the
class action arbitration clause was invalidated. Businesses
would have less incentive to include arbitration clauses in
adhesion contracts. A few losses to individual claimants were
one thing-but a single loss to a larger class of consumers was
perhaps too risky. Under those circumstances, businesses
might find the litigation process preferable to the arbitration
process (with its limited discovery possibilities, flexible rules
of evidence, and limited possibility of review).
What the
Court chose not to consider was what business would do if the
One
provision prohibiting class actions was upheld.
consequence of the
Court's decision in Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams 9 was the increased use of mandatory
arbitration clauses in employment contracts. After the AT&T
Mobility decision, it would not be far-fetched to anticipate two
strategic moves by business. The first would be to amend
employment application forms and contracts to include class
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action waivers as well as mandatory arbitration clauses. The
second would be to redraft all types of consumer sales
contracts to include mandatory arbitration clauses with class
action waivers. The end result might not only be the demise of
class action arbitration but also individual and class action
litigation for cases involving claims by consumers and
employees.
Although things do appear bleak for employees and
consumers seeking to invalidate mandatory arbitration with
anti-class action clauses, there is still the possibility of change.
Soon after the Supreme Court issued its decision in AT&T
Mobility, Representative Henry Johnson (D-GA) and Senator
Al Franken (D-MN) introduced a bill in Congress that was
intended to invalidate a number of the Court's recent decisions
93
involving arbitration. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011
would prohibit employers and businesses from including predispute mandatory arbitration clauses in employment and
consumer contracts where the subsequent conflicts involve
statutorily protected civil rights.
The likelihood that the
current Congress will pass the bill is quite slim. There is also
the possibility that the U.S. Supreme Court itself might revisit
its current policy in favor of mandatory consumer arbitration
clauses when it decides the case of CompCredit Corp., et al. v.
Greenwood, et a/. 94 Unfortunately discussion by the justices
during oral arguments indicated that their decision is going to
be a reiteration of majority' s support of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements.
One final possibility is that the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), under the provisions of
the Dodd-Frank Act, might be able to limit the future use of
arbitration agreements (at least as they apply to consumer
financial products such as credit cards, auto financing,
installment loans, and checking and deposit accounts.)
Congress authorized the CFPB is authorized to study the use of
mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and, if it
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was found to be in the public interest and would protect
consumers, issue regulations prohibiting the use of mandatory
. .
arb1trat10n agreements.

9

!d. at 7, quoting Beri nhout Decl., Exh. 2. It should be noted tha t under
the Californi a Code ofCivil Procedure§ 116.22 1, $7,500 is the maximum
claim that can be brought in a small cla ims court. Laster and Concepcion.
v. A T&T Mobility LLC. 584 F. 3d 849, 853 (2008).

The Roberts' Court has demonstrated in case after case that
it is indeed " the Corporate Court." Its willingness to enforce a
mandatory arbitration clause that prohibits class actions by
consumers is a lopsided decision in favor of business interests.
Consumers and employees have no real bargaining power
when they enter into standard form contracts that preclude
litigation. They know that they are in a " take it or leave it"
position. This is even more so now that the Court has
concluded that a claim of substantive unconscionability will
not be allowed to frustrate what it understands to be the higher
goal of the FA A.
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INTRODUCTION

Earnings management has been on the rise. The recent
corporate accounting scandals involving large well-known
companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Xerox and Tyco - all
audited by large accounting firms - suggest serious
deficiencies in the accounting standards and corporate
governance and regulatory systems designed to guide and
monitor the financial information process. 1 While large firms
may have received more media attention, financial statement
fraud occurred more frequently in smaller companies
(companies with total assets of less than $100 million) than
2
larger ones.
Since earnings management has been on the rise, a
definition of earnings management is in order. Earnings
management is when managers alter their entities' accounting
and financial information by using their discretion in financial
reporting and transaction structuring.
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